[guardian-dev] Adobe's build servers compromised, malware signed

Hans-Christoph Steiner hans at guardianproject.info
Fri Sep 28 10:58:40 EDT 2012


That's a good argument for keeping signing keys offline.

I'm a supporter of using Gitian, but I fail to see how gitian could
prevent the issue that happened there.  Someone compromised the server
that could sign code with the Adobe key and signed some of their own
malware with it.

Even with gitian, we still need to sign a specific build to upload to
the various app stores and Debian.  (In Debian, you're actually signing
source code, but same issue).  If the computer with our signing key was
compromised, the compromiser could sign arbitrary code with our key.

.hc

On 09/28/2012 01:16 AM, Miron wrote:
> 
> http://news.slashdot.org/story/12/09/27/2230218/adobe-revoking-code-signing-certificate-used-to-sign-malware
> 
> (yes, this is a Gitian plug... ;) )
> 
> 
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