[guardian-dev] Is there security risks on developing OTR addons for web browsers ?

Mohamed Akram Tabka tabkram at gmail.com
Wed Sep 25 18:07:21 EDT 2013


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Thank you for the explanation. I have a clear idea now.
the add-on on should be totally separated :)

A.

On 25/09/13 22:32, Natanael wrote:
> The general idea is that it's too easy to break crypto on the web.
> 
> Attackers can often too easily inject malicious javascript, often 
> disabling any encryption or leaking the private keys, and in 
> practically all cases leak the plaintext (the sent messages). Like 
> with the case of fake SSL certs being used against Gmail users,
> this is something to take seriously since these attacks can be
> 100% transparent to the user, there's often nothing at all that
> would seem suspicious to the user.
> 
> If you want to do crypto in a browser addon, then don't bother
> trying to interact with web pages if you want to make sure it's
> secure even against powerful attackers, do it in a separate window
> or sidebar where an attacker can't easily mess with your system.
> 
> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:15 PM, Mohamed Akram Tabka
> <tabkram at gmail.com> wrote: Hi all, I'm thinking about developping
> an OTR addon for handling OTR discussions on web browsers. Is it
> really secure ? Does really browser extensions for crypto
> operations pose threats to users security?
> 
> If it is not recommended to develop crypto addons for browsers
> please tell me.
> 
> All bests, A.
> 
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- -- 
Mohamed Akram Tabka
Tech intern at Access | AccessNow.org
Student at the National School of Computer Sciences
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