[guardian-dev] Codec2+Hardware Crypto: Fwd: [messaging] JackPair

Lee Azzarello lee at guardianproject.info
Thu Aug 21 05:09:23 EDT 2014


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This is awesome! It's the mythical "ZRTP over an acoustic modem"
problem. They have to do the key agreement by sending actual modem
sounds as binary data. I spoke with someone working on a similar
project last winter during the Eyebeam PRISM Breakup event. At least
this project is identical to what I remember having a conversation about.

Sucks that RedPhone is used as the benchmark since they intercept
calls to mislead the user into believing they made a secure call over
the PSTN when in reality it's VoIP.

- -lee

On 8/20/14, 11:09 AM, Nathan of Guardian wrote:
> 
> Interesting simple open hardware crypto voice device that uses
> Codec2 now on Kickstarter: 
> https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/620001568/jackpair-safeguard-your-phone-conversation
>
>  Good comments from Tom below....
> 
> 
> -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [messaging] JackPair 
> Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 09:54:04 -0500 From: Tom Ritter
> <tom at ritter.vg> To: Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> CC: messaging
> <messaging at moderncrypto.org>
> 
> On 19 August 2014 23:15, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Arne Renkema-Padmos 
>> <renkema.padmos at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> About communication of the fingerprint over the phone: maybe
>>> JackPair has some relevant insights?
>>> 
>>> https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/620001568/jackpair-safeguard-your-phone-conversation
>>
>>
>>
>>> 
This has to be one of the worst ideas I've seen in recent history.
> 
> Disagree :)
> 
>> We start with a Smartphone completely ready to be a handset for
>> an encrypted telephony app like RedPhone or Signal.
> 
> Well, not always. Sometimes we start with a flip burner phone, or
> a POTS line, or a device without a radio (iPod), etc.
> 
>> Except we don't trust it or something? So we try to airgap an
>> encryption key into a special purpose physical hardware.
> 
> If you have a smartphone, you're right you probably do trust it.
> But the ability to airgap onto dedicated hardware is desirable for
> a small percentage of people. I don't know if it's enough to
> support tremendous development in the area, but I would like to see
> some excursions into it.
> 
>> Both parties need the same device to communicate. That's a lot
>> harder than an app...
> 
> Harder is relative.  Harder to distribute physically: yes.  Harder
> to use or understand: I'm not so certain.  I would _love_ to see a 
> usability study of Signal, RedPhone, and this.
> 
>> Except... if we don't trust our phone to do encryption, why are
>> we using it to make encrypted phone calls? If we're making POTS
>> calls, we're on a network that can triangulate our location
> 
> I'm not sure why you're mixing content encryption with location
> privacy.
> 
>> , and if someone has compromised a Smartphone enough to get
>> encryption keys, they can probably use your handset's microphone
>> (or accelerometer) to figure out what you're saying.
> 
> I have strong doubts about accelerometer-based audio pickup in 
> real-world settings. It sounds a lot like stunt hacking to me.  If
> one compromises a smartphone thoroughly, yes, you should be able
> to exfiltrate plaintext audio through the handset mic.
> 
> 
> I see JackPair as many things, all of which I want to encourage: a)
> Open source encryption HARDWARE (I think...) b) Low-Cost (not as
> low as I'd like, but still low) dedicated hardware devices c) With
> hardcoded keys in a second-generation device, this becomes a 
> MITM-proof device that requires no key distribution: hand off the 
> device and key distribution is done d) Tackling 'legacy' cellular
> and POTS networks head-on
> 
> 
> -tom _______________________________________________ Messaging
> mailing list Messaging at moderncrypto.org 
> https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
> 
> 
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