[guardian-dev] Your Anonymous Posts to Secret Aren’t Anonymous After All

Hans-Christoph Steiner hans at guardianproject.info
Fri Aug 22 16:26:30 EDT 2014


Yeah, anonymity is hard.  I wonder if they even encrypt stuff they write to
local storage.

Good to see that Snapchat got busted for their grand claims backed by weak
implementations:
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were

.hc

Josh Steiner wrote:
> I'm noticing a pattern with these "private" apps:
> 
> http://www.wired.com/2014/08/secret/
> 
> What a terrible design:
> 
> Secret relies on the anonymity of the crowd to camouflage its users’
> identities. When you first install Secret, you can’t see any posts
> from your social circle until you give the app access to your phone’s
> contact list. Then the app checks all the e-mail addresses and phone
> numbers on the list for current Secret users, and you start following
> them. (You also can give it access to your Facebook profile for the
> same purpose, though that route was not vulnerable to the hack).
> 
> You must be following at least seven friends on the system before you
> can see your friends’ anonymous posts. Even then, you don’t know who
> among your contacts are using Secret: If you have 500 people in your
> contact list, and 30 of them are using Secret, you won’t know which 30
> they are. A juicy secret posted by a “friend” could belong to any of
> those 500 people.
> 
> The problem is, your address book is under your control. And that’s
> what Caudill and Seely used to their advantage.
> 
> Caudill’s first step was to create a bunch of fake Secret accounts.
> This is easy, because Secret doesn’t make you verify your e-mail
> address or phone number. Caudill wrote a simple script to rapidly
> create a pool of 50 accounts for his experiments, but he only needed
> seven to meet Secret’s secret-sharing threshold.
> 
> Next, he deleted everything from his iPhone’s contact list, and added
> the seven fake e-mail addresses as contacts. When he was done, he
> added one more contact: the e-mail address of the person whose secrets
> he wanted to unmask—me.
> 
> Then he signed up for another new Secret account and synced his
> contacts. He now had a new, blank Secret feed that followed eight
> accounts: seven bot accounts created and controlled by him, and mine.
> Anything that appeared as posted by a “friend” logically belonged to
> me.
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