[guardian-dev] Build process for Android Tor binary

Michael Rogers michael at briarproject.org
Tue Jan 7 07:13:19 EST 2014


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On 03/01/14 22:47, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
> These are both goals that we share with our apps that use Orbot.
> For out-of-band sharing, check out our work with adding p2p sharing
> to F-Droid as part of the Bazaar project.  I think we can help the
> situation there a lot by adding support for dependencies, so then
> ChatSecure/Briar/etc. could depend on Orbot like in
> Debian/Fedora/etc. and installing the app would also install Orbot
> if needed.

Support for dependencies would be very cool. But doesn't the user
still have to install the package management app and then use the
package management app to install the messaging app?

> Our experience is that hidden services perform quite poorly with
> frequent changes.  We'll be quite interested to see if you can
> improve that situation measureably, we've figured its not really
> usable for messaging as it is.

Yeah, it's going to be an interesting experiment. :-) My guess is that
we won't be able to make Tor jump through any new hoops, *but* because
we're concentrating on asynchronous messaging, it may be useful anyway.

Perhaps we should speak to the Tor devs who are redesigning hidden
services and ask them to bear this kind of use case in mind, in case
they're making any tradeoffs that would affect the ability to
republish hidden services frequently?

> Another thing you'd have to duplicate in your new tor
> implementation is linking up Tor with the Android lifecycle and
> also handling the wifi/cellular sleep states, as well as
> transitions between wifi and 3G, or sleeping tor on loss of
> internet.  Just running the tor daemon leaves out significant parts
> of the Android integration.

Yes, this is very much a first pass. I didn't know about the
org.torproject.android.service classes until now (thanks Nathan!) -
I'll check them out and see what I can learn about Android integration.

This will be an issue for other transport plugins too, so it may make
sense to factor some of these things out of the Tor code.

Cheers,
Michael

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