[guardian-dev] Update your servers for real

Lee Azzarello lee at guardianproject.info
Sat Sep 27 04:32:56 EDT 2014


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If I'm not mistaken, you just recommended not using bash as a
solution. is that correct?

- -lee

On 9/26/14, 1:24 PM, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
> 
> Another reason why bash should never be your /bin/sh.  For scripts
> that need bash, they can easily use the shebang #!/bin/bash.  dash
> provides a more secure, faster /bin/sh that is /bin/sh without
> unneeded extras.
> 
> .hc
> 
> Chris Ballinger wrote:
>> Saw this SIP server Shellshock scanner today: 
>> https://github.com/zaf/sipshock
>> 
>>> The exec module in Kamailio, Opensips and propably every other
>>> SER fork
>> passes the received SIP headers as environment viarables to the
>> invoking shell. This makes these SIP proxies vulnerable to
>> CVE-2014-6271 (Bash Shellshock). If a proxy is using any of the
>> exec funtions and has the 'setvars' parameter set to 1 (default)
>> then by sending SIP message containing a specially crafted header
>> we can run arbitrary code on the proxy machine.
>> 
>> Every time I read about the Shellshock vulnerability I get
>> flashbacks to this SNES game:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lASNUQ7M8gs
>> 
>> On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Lee Azzarello
>> <lee at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>> 
>> Weird. I'm using a Wheezy base install built via debootstrap on
>> an Open Hosting container. It uses bash by default for the root
>> user. Perhaps debootstrap or my platform build scripts override
>> the default shell for root to be bash?
>> 
>> Anyhoo, I think most people prefer Bash because it is very close
>> to a real programming language. This shellshock shitstorm might
>> be a setback for popular programming culture.
>> 
>> -lee
>> 
>> On 9/25/14, 9:48 PM, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> That's for "Lenny users:".  See this section:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Squeeze users:
>>>>> 
>>>>> * Dash is always installed. * /bin/sh is dash by default
>>>>> (even for upgraded systems).
>>>>> 
>>>>> .hc
>>>>> 
>>>>> Lee Azzarello wrote:
>>>>>> I'm confused. The article you linked is instructions to
>>>>>> install dash and configure a base system to use it as
>>>>>> default. Am I misunderstanding something?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -lee
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Thursday, September 25, 2014, Hans-Christoph Steiner
>>>>>> < hans at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> dash is still the default /bin/sh, for speed and
>>>>>>> security, but you can change that to bash if you want: 
>>>>>>> https://wiki.debian.org/DashAsBinSh
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Ubuntu also uses dash by default: 
>>>>>>> https://wiki.ubuntu.com/DashAsBinSh
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> .hc
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Lee Azzarello wrote:
>>>>>>>> This output is from a Debian stable base system built
>>>>>>>> with debootstrap and no additional packages
>>>>>>>> installed.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> root at debian:~# ls -l /bin/sh lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4
>>>>>>>> Jun 17 21:47 /bin/sh -> bash
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I don't think Debian has used Dash since Sarge.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> -lee
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 9/25/14, 1:36 PM, Dev Random wrote:
>>>>>>>>> This seems mitigated by the fact that /bin/sh is ->
>>>>>>>>> dash on debian. So unless something does explicitly
>>>>>>>>> #!/bin/bash, things should be okay.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> BTW, there's a related vuln that's not fixed yet - 
>>>>>>>>> CVE-2014-7169
>>>>>>>>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8365158
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 2014-09-25 at 08:48 -0400, Lee Azzarello
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> A remote code execution bug was found in the GNU
>>>>>>>>>> Bash shell.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q3/650
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I tested it on Debian stable from two days ago
>>>>>>>>>> and indeed, I could execute code after a function
>>>>>>>>>> definition in an environment variable. A server I
>>>>>>>>>> updated yesterday evening was not vulnerable, as
>>>>>>>>>> the Debian team got a patch released quite fast.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> This effects any server you run any code on,
>>>>>>>>>> though the remote code execution attack vector is
>>>>>>>>>> unlikely for many contemporary application
>>>>>>>>>> servers. Read the write up for details about a
>>>>>>>>>> proof of concept.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Good Morning!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> -lee
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