[guardian-dev] Connecting to nearby peers without user interaction

Nathan of Guardian nathan at guardianproject.info
Mon Feb 16 19:33:48 EST 2015



On Mon, Feb 16, 2015, at 07:10 PM, Paul Gardner-Stephen wrote:
> Hello all,
> 
> Just a heads up that we have finally been able to start working on
> merging
> the GilgaMesh functionality into Serval.  This should within a month or
> two
> result in the ability to send and receive encrypted, authenticated MeshMS
> messages between nearby handsets using the Bluetooth name hack. More news
> as we make progress.

Excellent. BTW, my proposed verb / name for this activity is "chime"
within the wind metaphor I am using. Chime is meant to be an
impl-indepedent description of async/broadcast announcing to physically
nearby peers that you are available to speak a certain protocol/scheme
via a specified hardware address or other radio identifier.

On the net, you ping. On the web, you link. In wind, you chime!



> 
> Paul.
> 
> On Sat, Feb 14, 2015 at 6:07 AM, Michael Rogers
> <michael at briarproject.org>
> wrote:
> 
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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> > On 13/02/15 16:33, Nathan of Guardian wrote:
> > >> In both cases, the Bluetooth MAC address is published in a DNS
> > >> TXT record via Wi-Fi Direct service discovery. Reverse
> > >> engineering the rest of the FireChat protocol is left as an
> > >> exercise for the reader. ;-)
> > >
> > > I had a change to speak with the Rangzen team recently
> > > (denovogroup.org/main/rangzen-project/) and they are doing the
> > > exact same thing.
> >
> > Cool! Maybe we should put together some docs on how to do this.
> >
> > > Would it make sense to publish more than the Bluetooth MAC in
> > > there? What about public keys, onions or other decentralized
> > > identity and routing information?
> >
> > I think it depends on the use case. If you want to reconnect to the
> > same peers via Tor when they're no longer in range, maybe it makes
> > sense to publish an onion address here. If you want to build a trust
> > system where you prefer to connect to recognised/reputable peers,
> > maybe it makes sense to publish identity information here. But my
> > instinct is KISS - publish only the information needed for making a
> > connection, then handle all the other stuff after you connect.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Michael
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-- 
  Nathan of Guardian
  nathan at guardianproject.info


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