[guardian-dev] Deniability and Duress

Tom Ritter tom at ritter.vg
Mon Jan 30 11:18:22 EST 2017

To answer your question: no. But fingerprint unlock is an option you
can enable, you don't have to use.

The idea that typing in the 'wrong' password or the 'wrong' finger
auto-deletes everything is going to get you charged with destruction
of evidence and probably obstruction and anything else they can throw
at you.) (Unless, of course, the deletion happens because of them: for
instance they try 10 passcodes and it auto-deletes, which is an option
(or maybe standard) on iPhones.  Or to their example, the wrong

(Also, this blog says "The thing is, what they want isn’t just
encryption, it’s deniability, which is a subtly different thing." -
they didn't say that at all. And I'm skeptical that the 'hidden
partition' notion of TrueCrypt is workable in the real world, and I'm
not the only one.)


On 27 January 2017 at 15:45, Matej Kovacic via guardian-dev
<guardian-dev at lists.mayfirst.org> wrote:
> Hi,
> have you seen this?
> http://www.mit.edu/~specter/articles/17/deniability1.html
> Is it possible to replace default Android fingerprint authentication
> with a custom one (without rooting the phone or recompiling OS)?
> Regards,
> M.
> --
> PGP Fingerprint: 1918 8C72 E5D6 B523 86E1  AC24 C82A C043 3D92 568D
> PGP Key:
> https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xC82AC0433D92568D
> Personal blog: https://pravokator.si
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