[Ssc-dev] Authentication, Authorization and Architecture

[Lee Azzarello]

I think sooner.  Considering its 10 pm est and timezones, how is 16:00 gmt?

Lee
On Mar 6, 2013 9:46 PM, "Harlo Holmes" <harlo.holmes at gmail.com> wrote:

> let's do another call tomorrow to go over these things. any time good for
> you all?
> On Mar 6, 2013 9:42 PM, "barbra" <blmack at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> hi
>>
>> some of what lee is proposing has come out of a discussion about how we
>> can have a secure API and more complex authorizations. The API-focus is
>> coming out of a few different needs:
>>
>> 1. IBA wants to seperate the file storage system from the
>> intake/verification system between the phone and server. An API way of
>> communicating between functionality seems like the most elegant way to
>> modularize (and would allow us to be more flexible on our server front-end
>> as well as with phone interfaces as well), as this functionality is
>> currently all intertwined in the existing system.
>> Out of Lee and my discussion today, it was clear that secure API calls
>> between these modular systems could be largely based on the work already
>> done that you mentioned Nathan. The different servers could follow the
>> same/similar verification process.
>>
>> 2. IBA is requesting a fair amount of functionality outside of the scope
>> of InformaCam
>> (e.g., complex reporting, sharing with external clients, exporting
>> submitted media, publishing on various outlets, etc.)
>> Again, an API approach seemed like the best solution with the most gains.
>> This we also considered OAuth as a good fit for. And it gives us a ready
>> answer as these types of request will just keep coming...i.e., "yes, you
>> can get that info through our API and use with x".
>>
>> 3. IBA is requesting more complex permissioning for the server-side of
>> users, as well as more complex evidence logs (and more complex logs are
>> required in ISO standard for digital repos)
>> This led us to review SELinux and Fedora Repository which both have
>> complex permissions engines involved.
>>
>> 4. General thoughts have been re-occurring on Guardian and IBA sides
>> about having a "published" catalog of media derivatives (e.g., to media
>> outlets, or for people who might be interested, etc.). This is something
>> that actually Witness already does (though not managed completely with an
>> IT system). Not a pressing needs, but something to consider as we refactor
>> the architecture this time around.
>>
>> I think Lee can speak to the need he sees with Math folks and the
>> permission sets.
>>
>> But I do think we needed to spend some time deciding how we would secure
>> our "public-ish" and our internal system API(s), and go about building some
>> permissions/authorization on the server-side.
>>
>> -barbra
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2013 at 9:20 PM, Harlo Holmes <harlo.holmes at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> I think this part of the project refers only to properly authenticating
>>> IBA staff members as they interact with already-submitted media. (like, who
>>> on the IBA team has access to view encrypted metadata, and keeping logs of
>>> who viewed what and when.)
>>>
>>> it should be outside the loop we established previously and has nothing
>>> to do with the mobile client or its users.  But Barbra can explain more...
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Harlo
>>> On Mar 6, 2013 9:03 PM, "Nathan of Guardian" <
>>> nathan at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Lee Azzarello <lee at rockingtiger.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >Nathan,
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >Can you describe the level of detail for authorization of roles from
>>>> >client to server? I don't think I understand the scope of this project
>>>> >not the requirements to ensure a chain of custody in a court of law.
>>>>
>>>> This is what the entire InformaCam IBA project has been doing for the
>>>> last year. The Chain Of Custody issue is solved based on the signing and
>>>> encryption Harlo has already implemented. You should be able to post
>>>> informacam blobs into the public internet, as long as they have been signed
>>>> by the submitters key and encrypted to the trusted parties key. We also
>>>> have the file hash submission process that is again, already designed and
>>>> implemented.
>>>>
>>>> The only roles there were ever meant to be were 1) known or unknown
>>>> person submitting a report from their device and 2) trusted party receiving
>>>> report and being able to unpack and verify integrity of report blob.
>>>>
>>>> I know we have added additional function to the server to allow
>>>> searching and browsing of reports, but super complex roles and distributed
>>>> computing authenticating mechanisms seems like we are way way out of any
>>>> design goals I am familiar with.
>>>>
>>>> Harlo, Bryan - can you provide some clarity here? Are we getting pushed
>>>> in directions by the IBA that I am not aware of?
>>>>
>>>> +n
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>>>
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