[guardian-dev] 81% of Tor users can be de-anonymised by analysing router information, research indicates

[Michael Rogers]

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On 14/11/14 21:23, Nathan of Guardian wrote:
> Otherwise, I am all about HIGH-latency anonymity systems these
> days, so the more we can think about mobile messaging over Tor as a
> transport for all things, the better!

I totally agree about the value of high-latency anonymity systems, and
unsurprisingly I also agree that messaging over Tor is a good idea,
but I think we should devote some time to working out how the two
things fit together - maybe try to get the Tor research community
interested.

If we simply use Tor as a low-latency transport for asynchronous
messaging then we're limited to Tor's threat model, i.e. we can't
prevent traffic confirmation attacks. If we revive one of the
remailers or build a new system then we're limited to a small number
of users, i.e. a small anonymity set. So ideally we'd find some way of
adding high-latency mix-like features to Tor.

Done right, this could provide a large anonymity set for the
high-latency users and improve the traffic analysis resistance of Tor
for the low-latency users at the same time, by providing a pool of
latency-insensitive traffic to smooth out the bursty low-latency
traffic between relays.

Cheers,
Michael
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